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Abstract
We analyze the effect of the coach’s gender on risk-taking in women sports teams
using data taken from National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) basketball
games. We find that the coach’s gender has a sizable and significant effect on
risk-taking, a finding that is robust to several empirical strategies, including an
instrumental variable approach. In particular, we find that risk-taking among teams
with a male head coach is 5 percentage points greater than that in teams with a
female head coach. This gap is persistent over time and across intermediate game
standings. The fact that risk-taking has a significantly positive effect on game
success suggests that female coaches should be more risk-taking.
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1 Introduction
Empirical evidence from surveys (Dohmen et al., 2011), laboratory experiments (Eckel and
Grossman, 2008; Charness and Gneezy, 2012), and field data (Barber and Odean, 2001)
indicate that women are more risk-averse than men. Such gender differences in risk-taking
are frequently discussed as a potential source of the gender gap in labor market outcomes
(Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2005; Blau and Kahn, 2017) and the underrepresen-
tation of women in top corporate jobs (OECD, 2012), including in academia. Evidence
from the field suggests that social norms play a key role in the formation of risk attitudes
(Sa¨ve-So¨derbergh and Sjo¨gren Lindquist, 2017). Albanese et al. (2016) argue that parents
transmit their values to their children and refer to this mechanism as ‘parental coaching”
(p. 590).
Researchers rarely know on which information risky decisions are based and a clear
measure of corporate risk-taking is difficult to operationalize. Thus, studies found positive,
negative, and no effects of female leadership on corporate risk-taking. We analyze risk-
taking in semi-professional intercollegiate basketball competitions. In particular, we study
the role of the head coach’s gender in player risk-taking. Basketball coaches act as top-
level managers who make influential decisions before and throughout each game. They
decide on the general system of play, including the level of risk-taking and other game
strategies. Basketball, among sports in general, provides an ideal environment in which
to study risk-taking because its rewards and rules are clear, and the available data allow
a precise identification of risk and measurement of performance.
The evidence on how female CEOs or board members influence firm risk-taking is
ambiguous. Amore and Garofalo (2016) find that female leadership during periods of high
competition increases the stability of banks, while lowering returns, whereas banks led by
men increase both risk-taking and financial performance. Faccio et al. (2016) analyze
data on companies from 21 countries covering 1999 through 2009 and find that companies
where a male CEO is substituted with a female CEO display less corporate risk-taking.
In general, they find that being led by a woman increases a firm’s survival probability.
Analyzing data on emerging markets in central and eastern Europe covering 2005 to
2012, Andries et al. (2017) find that female-led banks exhibited higher stability during
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the financial crisis, which they attribute to lower levels of risk. Examining Vietnamese
banks from 2009 to 2016, Hoang and Nguyen (2018) find that the introduction of female
board members reduced risk-taking.
To the contrary, Peltoma¨ki et al. (2018) find that women-led S&P 1500 firms take
more corporate risk. Using data from German banks covering 1994 to 2010, Berger et
al. (2014) find that executive boards with more female members take more portfolio risk.
Using data collected through surveys of companies in Sweden and the US, Adams and
Funk (2012) find that female board members report themselves as more risk-taking than
their male counterparts.
Several studies find that female leadership has no effect on corporate risk-taking.
For example, Wu et al. (2018) find no evidence that female leadership affects risk taking
among US banks. Analyzing large US companies, Sila et al. (2016) find no evidence
that female representation on boards influences firms’ equity risk. Similarly, Adams and
Ragunathan (2017) find that US banks with a larger share of female directors did not
operate less riskily than banks with fewer female directors during the 2008 financial crisis.
The selection of women in leadership roles may pose a problem for our analysis
because it could arise from unobserved characteristics. For example, women may prefer to
work at firms pursuing a low-risk corporate strategy. Consequently, conventional methods
will lead to biased estimates of the effect of female leadership on risk-taking. Since this
problem cannot be ruled out in the context of collegiate basketball, we use an instrumental
variable (IV) approach to assess the robustness of our empirical analysis.
We find a significant and sizable effect of a male head-coach on the teams’ risk-taking.
This difference is persistent over the course of several games and across intermediate score
differences. We use the number of female professors at a college as an instrument for the
probability that the women’s basketball team is coached by a female head coach. The
results of this IV approach confirm our estimates and indicate that our results are robust.
We find that risk-taking during the first 10 minutes of a game increases scoring.
Risk-taking benefits women’s teams with female head coaches (as with men’s teams). By
contrast, more risk-taking does not increase the chances of victory among women’s teams
with male head coaches. We conclude that female teams coached by women take too few
risks and could improve their performance by taking more.
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2 Data and Empirical Approach
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) basketball is the second highest level of
basketball competition in the US. Intercollegiate contests started in 1893, and the men’s
NCAA championship was inaugurated in 1939. The current championship format for
women’s college basketball was introduced in 1981. Currently, 351 men’s teams and 349
women teams compete for the championships. During an initial round-robin stage, they
play approximately 20 to 35 regular season games.1 The 64 highest-ranked teams are
selected for a 64-team seven-round championship tournament.
We use play-by-play data taken from men’s and women’s NCAA Division I collegiate
basketball games from seasons 2008 through 2015.2 The data cover 5,732 regular season
games for women, as well as 368 games for women’s teams in the NCAA championship
tournaments. We restrict the data to teams that played in the NCAA tournament at
least once during the period; this criterion restricts the data to teams that performed at
the highest level of collegiate basketball. In addition, we collect data on 15,224 men’s
NCAA regular season games to compare success and risk-taking between female and male
teams. There is no gender variation for the male teams, as all men’s teams have male
head coaches.
We observe 535,658 throwing attempts of female players and their outcomes. Teams
are awarded two points if they score from within an area clearly marked by a line, resem-
bling an arc at a distance of about 19 feet and 9 inches from the basket. In the 2008/9
season, the distance was extended to 20 feet and 9 inches for men. In 2011/12, the dis-
tance was also extended for women. A successful attempt from beyond this line-without
a foot or any body part touching it-is rewarded with three points instead of two. In our
data, slightly above 27.48% of all attempts made by women are three-point attempts. In
addition to the potential yield and success rates, the data also provide detailed informa-
tion about the scores of both teams as well as the exact timing of each attempt. Table 1
provides descriptive statistics for key variables in our empirical analysis.
1We include conference tournaments in the regular season sample. The exact number of regular season
varies across competition levels and conferences.
2All play-by-play data were collected from ESPN.com. A substantial share of our data comprise obser-
vations of all actions, including throwing attempts from the field or free-throw line.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of main variables for women’s games.
regular season NCAA tournament
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
three-point attempta 0.274 - 0.279 -
attempt successfulb 0.413 - 0.408 -
home gamec 0.498 - - -
score differenced 2.012 13.459 -1.063 13.010
minutes remainingd 19.896 11.459 19.945 11.518
N 495,371 40,287
a Binary indicators equal to 1 if observed attempt is a three-point attempt, 0 else. b Binary indicators
equal to 1 if observed attempt is successful, 0 else. c Binary indicators equal to 1 if throwing attempt is
observed for the home team. All NCAA tournament games are staged on neutral ground. d Continuous
variables measuring score difference and time remaining (in mins.) before the observed attempt.
The share of three-point attempts, especially in critical situations, is an established
indicator of risk-taking in basketball (Grund et al., 2013; Bo¨heim et al., 2016). Figure 2
illustrates the distribution of three-point attempts over the duration of games for both
men’s and women’s teams. These figures demonstrate that women’s teams coached by
a male head coach behave similarly to men’s teams, whereas women coached by women
make markedly fewer three-point attempts. The difference in risk-taking is small in regular
season games and non-existent in NCAA tournament games. For women’s teams, the
average yield of three-point attempts is 0.97, with a standard deviation of 1.40, while the
average yield for two-point attempts is 0.89 with a standard deviation of 0.99.
Using three-point attempts as a risk measure may pose a concern because teams may
actively seek to be awarded free throws. For example, teams with a more physical style
of play could forgo the risky three-point attempt and focus instead on being fouled close
to the basket while attempting a two-point shot. Being fouled will result in an additional
free throw. A successful result can produce a gain of three points. If a physical style of
play were associated with a male style of either play or coaching, our risk measure would
indicate a certain style of play rather than risk-taking propensity.
Figure 1 plots the average absolute number of attempted free throws by team and
coach gender for all regular season games.3 The average number of free throws awarded
to teams with female coaches is slightly higher for women’s teams with female coaches
than for teams with male coaches. We can thus safely ignore this concern in our analysis.
3We can use only regular season games for this descriptive analysis, as we do not observe free throws
in the NCAA tournament data.
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Figure 1: Average number of free-throws by team and coach gender
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Three-point attempt as a share of all scoring attempts from the field by team and coach gender.
Women’s teams with male coaches have two-point attempt success rates that are
almost identical to those of women’s teams with female coaches: Both types of teams
score at a rate of 44.7% when attempting a two-point attempt. Women’s teams with a
female coach have a success rate of 32.4%, and women’s teams led by a male coach score
on 32.2% of their three-point attempts. Figure 3 illustrates the three-point success rates
of male and female teams in the regular season and NCAA tournament.
In the regular season, male teams are slightly better at three-point attempts during
the game, while there is no difference for female teams according to coach gender. In
the NCAA tournament, male and female teams have equal success rates for three-point
attempts. For tournaments games, teams with a female coach appear to be slightly more
successful than those with a male coach, but this difference is not statistically significant.
Teams with a female coach convert 32.4% of their attempts, while teams with a male
coach convert 30.9% during NCAA tournament contests.
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Figure 2: Ratio of three-point attempts over all scoring attempts.
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Notes: Three-point attempt as a share of all scoring attempts from the field by team and coach gender.
Figure 3: Three-point success by team and coach gender
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Notes: Success ratio of three-point attempts by team and coach gender.
Different players have different abilities, which could affect teams’ risk-taking behav-
ior. At the end of the regular season, the NCAA selection committee creates a “seed list”,
a consensual ranking of the teams by region in descending order in which a team’s seed
reflects its relative qualitative assessment.
Figure 2 illustrates the average NCAA tournament seeding for all women’s teams.
The average seed for teams with female coaches is lower than that for teams with male
coaches. This suggests that the average ability of teams coached by women (based on
regular season success) is greater than that of teams coached by men. This suggests that
female coaches do not select themselves to low-ability teams.
The average seed for teams with female coaches is lower than the average seed for
team with male coaches. This suggests that the average ability of teams coached by
women (based on success in the regular seasons) is greater than for teams coached by
men. We interpret this as evidence that female coaches do not select themselves to low-
ability teams.
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In our sample of 136 women’s teams, 14 changed from a male to female head coach
and 16 changed from a female to a male coach. For this subset of teams, we investigate
risk-taking, three-point attempt success, and wins in the two seasons before a change
of coach and in the four years after the change. The first panel in 6 illustrates the
percentage of three-point attempts out of all throwing attempts. On average, we see no
marked difference in attempts before the change.4 After the change, however, teams that
switch from a male coach to a female coach have significantly fewer three-point attempts
than those that switch from a female to a male coach.
A change in risk-taking could be a consequence of the event that triggered the coach-
ing change. For example, coaches might have been willing to take excessive risk to save
their job before the change occurred, while new coaches might be induced to take a more
conservative approach. In seasons 3 and 4 post-change, however, risk-taking increases for
teams that changed from a female to a male coach. For teams that switched from a male
to a female coach, we see a decline in risk-taking for all post-change years.
Regarding success rates, the middle panel of Figure 6 illustrates that a change in
coach gender is associated with an almost unchanged success rate for three-point attempts.
Consequently, we conclude that the increase in risk-taking that might have been induced
by a change in coach is not due to differences in ability. The third panel of Figure 6
illustrates that the coach changes are not associated with differences in win rates.
Figure 4: Women’s teams: three-point and two-point attempt success coach gender
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Notes: Success ratio of three-point attempts by team and coach gender.
4Our data include five teams that changed their head coach twice in the sample period. We do not
include these in the analysis presented in 6
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Figure 5: Women’s teams: average NCAA tournament seed by coach gender
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Notes: Average NCAA tournament seed by coach gender for women’s teams in season 2008–2015.
Figure 6: Risk-taking and success before and after coach change by type of change
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Notes: Average percentage of three-point attempts of all attempts from the field (top panel), average success percentage of three-point attempts
(middle panel) and win percentage (lower panel) by timing of change and change type. [-2,-1] indicates two years before the change, [1,2]
indicates the first two years after the change, while [3,4] denotes years 3 and 4 after the change of the coach. Regular season and NCAA
tournament, only team who change coach gender in years 2008 through 2015.
At each point in time t during a game, any player with the ball has to decide whether
to make a two- or three-point attempt. We analyze the effect of coach gender on risk-
taking by estimating the following model:
three− pointit = β0 + β1coachfemalei + φ′Xit + it, (1)
where three− pointit is a binary variable equal to 1 if the observed throwing attempt by
a player of team-season i at time t during a game is a three-point attempt, and 0 if it is a
two-point attempt. β1 is the coefficient of interest, as it reports the effect of the coach’s
gender on the probability of a three-point attempt. Xit is a vector of control variables,
which are the score difference, time remaining in the game, academic year and month, as
well as (for the regular season sample) if the observed team plays at home or away. In
addition, in an attempt to control for a team ability, we include the win-percentage of
the previous season. Obviously, the strength of the opposing team will affect a team’s
willingness to take risks. Consequently, we include indicators for the opposing-team.
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For the NCAA tournament sample, we use tournament seed indicators to control for
unobserved differences in ability.
We cannot rule out the possibility that our results suffer from an omitted variable
bias-for example, if we fail to control for team-specific differences in playing styles. Conse-
quently, we also include team fixed effects in the model. These results indicate the effect of
head-coach gender on risk-taking via the subsample comprised of teams that experienced
a change in head-coach gender during the observed sample period.
Table 2 tabulates the results for the pooled regular season and NCAA tournament
samples. We estimate that the probability of a three-point attempt is 5 percentage points
lower if the team is coached by a woman. Qualitatively, this result is confirmed by a model
that includes team-season fixed effects; however, the effect is smaller, at 2.4 percentage
points. Using observations from the NCAA tournament sample only, we estimate that
female teams with a female coach are almost 6.5 percentage points less likely to make a
three-point attempt than female teams with a male coach. This result is robust to the
inclusion of tournament seed in the list of covariates.
Table 2: Estimated effect of coach gender on risk-taking — pooled sample.
regular season NCAA tournament
(1) (2) (3) (4)
coach female -0.0542*** -0.0233*** -0.0745*** -0.0646***
(0.0023) (0.0051) (0.0087) (0.0090)
minutes left -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0003* -0.0004*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
score difference -0.0008*** -0.0007*** -0.0017*** -0.0013***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003)
win percentage -0.0300*** -0.0174** -0.1283*** -0.0802**
previous season (0.0067) (0.0079) (0.0285) (0.0360)
Team FE No Yes - -
Seed FE - - No Yes
Opponent-season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 495,371 40,287
R2 0.020 0.029 0.038 0.039
The Dependent variable is equal to 1 if the observed throwing attempt is a three-point attempt. All specifications
include month and home field dummies. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10-percent level,
5-percent level, and 1-percent level, respectively. Standard errors, clustered by team-year, in round parentheses.
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The location of a game can also influence risk-taking. Games played on the home
court could lead to a home field advantage or, alternatively, a friendly home crowd could
lead to increased pressure to perform, causing a ‘home-choke’ (Harb-Wu et al., 2017;
Bo¨heim et al., 2018).
Column (1) of Table 3 tabulates the estimated coefficients from regressions where we
stratify the sample according to whether the game was played at home or away.5 Our
results indicate that risk-taking during home games, for which we can assume increased
pressure to perform, does not differ from risk-taking during away games.
Analyzing the risk-taking of professional chess players, Gerdes and Gra¨nsmark (2010)
find that both men and women increase risk-taking when they compete against women
rather than men. We therefore also stratify the sample according to the gender of the
opposing team’s head coach. Columns (4) to (7) of Table 3 tabulate the results for
these subsamples. We find that teams with a female head coach have a 5 percentage
points lower probability to attempt a three-point attempt regardless of the opposing head
coach’s gender. The same is true for the NCAA tournament sample.
Table 3: Estimated effect of coach gender on risk-taking - sample splits
regular season NCAA tournament
game location opp.coach gender
home away male female male female
coach female -0.0483*** -0.0587*** -0.0606*** -0.0506*** -0.0700*** -0.0645***
(0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0040) (0.0029) (0.0194) (0.0097)
N 224416 270955 181475 313896 14845 25442
R2 0.022 0.025 0.022 0.018 0.041 0.040
The Dependent variable is equal to 1 if the observed throwing attempt is a three-point attempt. All specifications include month and home
field dummies. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level, respectively. Standard
errors, clustered by team-year, in round parentheses.
5All NCAA tournament games are played on a neutral field. Consequently, tournament data are not
available for this analysis.
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We provide further estimates of risk-taking for additional subsamples. First, we
stratify the sample according to the time when the attempt was observed. We split
the sample into eight time periods of eight minutes each, ignoring attempts made during
overtime. The results are illustrated in Figure 7. We find a three-point attempt probability
that is 5 percentage points lower for women’s teams coached by a female head coach
regardless of the time of the attempt.
We also analyze risk-taking separately for various score differences and stratify the
sample according to whether the team was trailing or leading when the attempt was
made. The results for several score difference intervals are plotted in Figures 8. Again,
the coach-gender effect is found for all intermediate score differences.
Figure 7: Estimated coach gender effect on risk taking—timing of the game.
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Figure 8: Estimated coach gender effect on risk taking—intermediate standing.
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To analyze the interaction between the timing and intermediate score of a game, we
split the sample into three score-difference categories: trailing by more than four points,
a close score at the interval (-4, 4), and a decisive lead of more than four points. We
estimate model 1 for all eight five-minute time periods of regulation time in the observed
games. The estimated coefficients for the female head-coach dummy are presented in
appendix Figure 14. Again, we find a remarkably persistent coach-gender gap in team
risk-taking over time and across intermediate scores.
3 Instrumental variable approach
A collegiate basketball program might base its decision to hire a male of female coach
on the general ability and risk-attitude of the team. For example, a women’s team with
many risk-loving players who are highly successful in converting attempts from beyond the
three-point line could actively pursue a male coach. We cannot directly observe the risk
preferences and season-specific characteristics of teams directly, which may result in an
omitted variable bias. In order to account for this potential bias, we further analyze risk-
taking using an instrumental variable approach. This approach rests on the assumption
that, conditional on our instrument, hiring a male or female coach is random – in other
words, that the hiring of female coaches is not related to a team’s willingness to take risks.
To ensure that we obtain a valid instrument, we use information on the size of the
academic staff of all the colleges in our data.6 The instrumental variable is constructed as
the log of the absolute number of academic staff members at each observed university on
the professor level.7 As pointed out before, female coaches are on average coaching more
successful women’s NCAA teams. Consequently, we should expect that hiring top-level
female coaches will demand higher financial commitment than employing a male coach.
The larger a university’s academic staff, the greater its overall financial resources should
be; thus, they should be able to hire more female coaches. We are confident that we can
6Data on academic employment and total student enrollment were collected from the Integrated Post-
secondary Education Data System (IPEDS), which is provided by the National Center for Education
Statistics (NCES). It is available at https://nces.ed.gov/datatools/ and described in the data ap-
pendix A.
7As an alternative, we also use relative female representation on the professorial level (i.e. the ratio of
female to male professors). This alternative instrument yields quantitatively and qualitatively comparable
results. All results are available upon request.
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rule out any direct effect of academic staff size on female basketball players’ decisions
concerning three-point attempts. Figure 9 plots the mean of our instrumental variable
according to the gender of the women’s basketball teams’ head coach. Colleges with a
large academic staff, and thus probably wealthier, are more likely to have a female head
coach for their women’s basketball team.
Figure 9: Number of professors by gender of women’s basketball head-coach.
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Notes: Mean value of instrumental variable (log of absolute number of professors) by head-coach gender of women’s NCAA basketball programs.
Table 4 presents the results of estimating the effect of the coach’s gender on risk-
taking via 2SLS. The estimations use the same set of covariates as are used in our OLS
regressions. The coefficients from the first-stage regressions indicate a strong positive
relation between the instrument and the probability of having a female head coach. We
estimate that a female head coach reduces a team’s risk-taking probability by about 9
percentage points. Again, we find no differences between home and away teams. The
coach-gender effect for the NCAA tournament sample is estimated to be larger, at about
17 percentage points. Figure 10 illustrates the estimated coefficients β1 for sample strat-
ification according to elapsed game time. The negative effect on risk-taking of a female
head coach is constant over the course of the game. We find a similar result for stratifica-
tion across score differences, plotted in Figure 11. We estimate that teams with a female
head coach have a consistently negative effect over the range of score differences, with
the exception of large negative and very s mall positive score differences, where we find
no statistically significant results. Overall, the IV approach confirms the results of the
earlier OLS and fixed-effects estimations. Thus, we conclude that the selection of coaches
to teams does not systematically bias our OLS results.
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Table 4: IV Estimated effect of coach gender on risk-taking.
regular season
pooled home away NCAA tournament
coach female -0.0905*** -0.106*** -0.0759*** -0.172***
(0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.035)
first stage 0.205*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.281***
coefficient (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.037)
F-statisticsa 45.68 45.88 45.76 59.15
N 495,371 253,267 242,104 40,287
mean dep. variable 0.274 0.280 0.268 0.279
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the observed throwing attempt is a three-point attempt. All specifications
include month dummies, and opponent fixed-effects. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10-
percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level, respectively. Standard errors, clustered by team-year, in round
parentheses. a Kleibergen and Paap (2006) statistics on the instrument in the first stage.
Figure 10: IV estimates: coach gender effect on risk taking - timing of the game
−
.
3
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
e
st
im
at
ed
 c
oa
ch
−g
en
de
r e
ffe
ct
H 1_1 H 1_2 H 1_3 H 1_4 H 2_1 H 2_2 H 2_3 H 2_4
95 % conf. interv.
Regular season
Notes: 2SLS estimates for coach gender effect on the probability of a three-point attempt. Each point indicates a point estimate derived from
2SLS estimation for a sub-sample at a particular time interval during a game.
Figure 11: IV estimates: coach gender effect on risk taking - intermediate score
−
.
3
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
e
st
im
at
ed
 c
oa
ch
−g
en
de
r e
ffe
ct
>10[10 6][5 3][2 1]tied[−1 −2][−3 −5][−6 −10]<−10
95 % conf. interv.
Regular season
Notes: 2SLS estimates for coach gender effect on the probability of a three-point attempt. Each point indicates a point estimate derived from
2SLS estimation for a sub-sample at a particular score-difference interval.
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4 Risk-taking and success
We show that the presence of female head coaches on women’s NCAA basketball teams
significantly lowers the probability of three-point attempts. This coach-gender effect is
constant across game locations, in-game timing, score differences, and opposing team’s
head-coach gender. However, we have not confirmed if this difference in risk-taking is
related to success.
Attempt-level success. We consider a three-point attempt successful if it results in
a three-point score. Table 5 presents the results of a linear probability model where the
dependent variable is equal to 1 if the observed attempt was successful and 0 if it was not.
We cannot reject the null hypothesis of no effect, as we find no statistically significant
different success rates between teams with a female head coach and those with a male
head coach. Consequently, we conclude that the coach’s gender does not affect throwing
attempt success.
Table 5: Effect of coach gender on success of risk-taking — individual throwing attempt
regular season NCAA tournament
(1) (2) (3) (4)
coach female 0.0018 0.0023 -0.0004 -0.0110
(0.0029) (0.0072) (0.0117) (0.0113)
minutes left 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0004)
score difference -0.0002 -0.0006*** -0.0008* -0.0017***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0005)
win percentage 0.0575*** 0.0262** 0.2378*** 0.0639
previous season (0.0091) (0.0123) (0.0412) (0.0527)
Team FE No Yes - -
Seed FE - - No Yes
Opponent-season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 135,685 11,238
R2 0.017 0.019 0.041 0.044
The Dependent variable is equal to 1 if the observed throwing attempt is a three-point attempt.All spec-
ifications include month and home field dummies. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the
10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level, respectively. Standard errors, clustered by team-year,
in round parentheses.
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Quarter-level success. Success is the outcome of multiple periods involving a series of
risk-taking decisions. To control for the relative strength of the matched teams, we divide
the play time into intervals of 10 minutes.8 This allows us to control for the initial score
difference at the beginning of these sub-periods. We analyze the intermediate outcomes
of 5,109 women’s games and 12,699 men’s games in the NCAA regular season.
Figure 12 plots the average win probabilities by quarter and quartiles of the risk-
taking distribution. The indicator of risk is the share of three-point attempts in all at-
tempts, excluding free throws. Except for the fourth quarter, the win probability for men’s
teams increases with risk-taking. For women’s teams, this is not the case. For women’s
teams with female coaches, we see, in each sub-quarter, a lower win probability when
risk-taking is greater. In the fourth quarter, higher levels of risk-taking are associated
with lower win probabilities for all three types of team. Teams that are trailing heavily
close to the end of games increase risk-taking as a measure of last resort, by “gambling
for resurrection” (Downs and Rocke, 1994).
Figure 12: Success and risk-taking: correlation of wins and risk-taking.
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8All NCAA games are staged in two halves of 20 minutes each, without overtime.
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We estimate the following OLS model to investigate the relationship between risk-
taking and quarter-level success:
Yioq = β0 + β1riskioq + φ
′Xioq + ξi + pio + ioq, (2)
where Yioq measures productivity at the sub-quarter level using different indicators for
team i playing opponent o in sub-quarter q = 1, 2, 3.9 We therefore restrict the analysis
to sub-quarters 1 to 3. We use three proxies for productivity or success in the observed
quarter. First, we use a binary variable equal to 1 if the observed team wins the game and
0 otherwise. We also use the total points scored and the difference between the teams’
scores in a sub-quarter (net points scored) as dependent variables. The model uses team-
season, opponent-season, and sub-quarter fixed effects. The variable riskiqo measures
the share of three-point attempts in all throwing attempts, excluding free throws. Since
the relationship between risk-taking and success might be nonlinear, we also estimate
a specification where we use indicators of the quartiles of the three-point attempt ratio
distribution. The vector Xiqo contains control variables, including the total number of
throwing attempts from the field, the initial score difference and the number of points
score at the beginning of the sub-quarter, and a home-game indicator.
The estimation results are tabulated in Table 6. We estimate that a higher level
of risk-taking (i.e. a higher three point ratio) is associated with more points scored and
more net points scored for all three types of teams. For men’s teams and women’s teams
with a female coach, we also estimate a positive relationship between risk-taking and the
probability to win the sub-quarter. We do not estimate such a significant association for
women’s teams with a male coach.
A nonlinear relationship is illustrated in Figure 13, where we present the estimated
coefficients on the indicators for the quartiles of the risk distribution (the omitted category
is the first quartile, comprising the teams that take the least risk). The results indicate
that teams that take more risk score more points (see panel A). In panel B of Figure 13,
9As a robustness check, we restrict the sample of sub-quarters to those that are initially close in terms
of the overall score. We use sub-quarters where teams are initially only four points apart (a one-score
game), meaning that the score differences are restricted to the interval (-4, 4). The results of these
restricted-sample regressions confirm our results.
18
we see that teams that take more risk have a better score differences in the sub-quarters.
Panel C indicates that teams that take more risk are more likely to win a sub-quarter.
Overall, we find few differences between men’s teams, women’s teams coached by
men, and women’s teams coached by women. However, women’s teams coached by men
appear to benefit less than the other two types of team.10
Table 6: Estimated effect of risk-taking on success: sub-quarter level.
Women
Men female coach male coach
Dep. var.: total points scored
three point 2.7923*** 2.3793*** 1.3121***
ratio (0.1418) (0.3325) (0.4263)
Dep. var.: net points scored
three point 2.6496*** 1.6273*** 0.8435
ratio (0.1948) (0.4692) (0.5716)
Dep. var.: sub-quarter win (binary)
three point 0.0451*** 0.0603*** 0.0309
ratio (0.0113) (0.0225) (0.0263)
N 65,136 16,020 9,480
Only sub-quarters 1 through 3 are included. Each coefficient is derived from a separate regression. All specifications
include month, team-season, and opponent-season dummies. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10-
percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level. Standard errors, clustered by team-year, in parentheses.
10The results for the fourth sub-quarter only indicate a negative association between risk-taking and
sub- quarter outcomes. However, this result is likely to be affected by reverse causality, as teams that are
performing badly may resort to more risky strategies to have any chance to win the game. Figure 16 in
the appendix B presents estimates for the fourth quarter only.
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Figure 13: Success and risk-taking: sub-quarter outcomes.
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Game-level success. We analyze the effect of risk-taking on the overall likelihood of
winning a game. Similar to our analysis of sub-quarter outcomes, we use only three-point
attempts from the first, second, and third game sub-quarters to calculate our measure of
risk-taking. We estimate OLS regressions where we use a binary indicator for winning for
each team-game observation. We estimate the regression separately for the three team
types using the overall ratio of three-point attempts to all attempts, excluding free throws,
as a proxy for risk-taking. We also estimate specifications where we use the quartiles of
this distribution as explanatory variables. We also include month, team-season, and
opponent-season fixed effects.
The estimation results are tabulated in Table 6. The results suggest that men’s
teams and women’s teams coached by women benefit from risk-taking. For these two team
types, we find that attempting 10 percentage points more three-point attempts leads to
an approximately 1 percentage point greater chance of winning the game. Women’s teams
coached by men take as much risk as men’s teams, on aver age; the means of risk-taking
are 0.31 and 0.34. While men’s teams that take more risk are more likely to win the game,
we cannot reject the null hypothesis for women’s teams. The estimated coefficient is not
statistically significant at conventional levels.
When we use the set of indicator variables to describe the distribution of the risk-
taking indicator, we find for men’s teams a clearly positive gradient for risk-taking. For
women’s teams coached by women, we find a positive association between risk-taking
and winning a game only for teams in the fourth quartile of the risk-taking distribution.
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By contrast, women’s teams coached by men do not appear to increase their chances of
winning a game when they take more risk.
Table 7: Estimated effect of risk-taking on success: game level.
Women
Men female coach male coach
three point 0.1326*** 0.1199*** 0.0837
ratio (0.0223) (0.0463) (0.0562)
quartile 2 0.0234*** -0.0005 0.0001
(0.0088) (0.0130) (0.0207)
quartile 3 0.0292*** 0.0281 0.0227
(0.0091) (0.0172) (0.0232)
quartile 4 0.0499*** 0.0472** 0.0304
(0.0092) (0.0210) (0.0236)
mean dep. var. 0.5903 0.5899 0.6013
mean risk-taking 0.3404 0.2610 0.3162
N 21,712 5,340 3,160
R2 0.350 0.350 0.508 0.508 0.532 0.532
Only quarters 1 through 3 are included. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the observed team wins the game, 0 if it loses. All
specifications include month, team-season, as well as opponent-season dummies, as well as the total number of attempts from the field as
a continuous control variable. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level.
Standard errors, clustered by team-year, in round parentheses.
5 Conclusion
We analyze the effect of female leadership on risk-taking using data from NCAA basket-
ball games. We estimate the effect of the head-coach’s gender on risk-taking for women’s
teams. We consider three-point attempts, relative to the safer option of two-point at-
tempts, as a risk-taking indicator. We find a significant and sizable negative effect of
a female head-coach on risk-taking; this varies little depending on whether the game is
played at home or away. This effect of the coach’s gender on risk-taking is persistent
over the course of games and across intermediate score differences. The effect is slightly
stronger for NCAA tournament games, where teams are selected based on past perfor-
mance and where stakes are greater than during the regular season. We find that the
gender of the opposing team’s head coach has no effect on risk-taking.
21
We use an IV approach to establish a causal link between the head coach’s gender
and risk-taking. We use the absolute size of professorial academic staff as an instrument
for the probability that the women’s basketball team is coached by a woman. The results
confirm our OLS estimates.
Moreover, we find that coach gender has no effect on success at the individual throw
level, while sub-quarter success in the first three sub-quarters is positively associated with
risk-taking. At the game level, we find that men’s teams and women’s teams coached by
women are more likely to win a game when their risk-taking is high. We do not find this
association for women’s teams coached by men.
Overall, we find a clear effect of coach gender on team risk-taking behavior for
women’s teams. This appears to be a manifestation of the coach’s risk preferences rather
than of gender-specific differences in the physical style of basketball play. Most male
coaches are former professional players, who could incorporate the more physical play
of men’s basketball into their style of coaching. However, playing more physically could
lead to more two-point attempts being thrown closer to the basket and being fouled more
often. We find no evidence for this.
Moreover, over recent years, three-point attempts have become a dominant strategy
in US (male) professional basketball. Figure 15 in the appendix illustrates, however,
that the share of three-point attempts in all attempts from the field has remained almost
constant for men’s and women’s teams with male coaches. Consequently, we argue that
differences in coaches’ risk preferences are the most likely explanation for our empirical
results.
Our findings offer important implications for leadership structures and the represen-
tation of women in top management positions and boards. We contribute to the ongoing
discussion by providing field evidence for a significant effect of female leadership on risk-
taking. In particular, we confirm earlier findings of a risk-decreasing effect of female
leadership in companies and banks (Faccio et al., 2016; Andries et al., 2017; Hoang and
Nguyen, 2018). One particular advantage of our data is that they offer the opportunity
to closely investigate the link between success and risk-taking. Our results suggest that
female-led women’s teams benefit from increased risk-taking similarly to men’s teams. By
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contrast, women’s teams coached by men do not benefit significantly from increasing the
level of risk.
One potential shortcoming of our analysis is that we cannot distinguish between
risk-taking and aggressive play. In essence, male coaches could simply choose the most
aggressive-and, in this case, more risky-strategy in an aggressive attempt to win. In this
case, higher risk-taking by female coaches would not originate from differences in risk
preferences, but differences in competitiveness.
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A DATA APPENDIX
The data was gathered from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS),
which is provided by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). For the en-
rollment data, the subcategory Gender, attendance status, and level of student in the
category Fall Enrollment was chosen.
For the years 2012-2015 the absolute numbers (as well as relative shares) of professors
was calculated with the data obtained in the category Human Resources, and the respec-
tive subcategories Full-time instructional staff by academic rank, faculty and tenure status,
race/ethnicity and gender and New classifications for faculty and tenure status. There,
only Professors were selected in the Instructional staff category. To gather the data for
the years 2008 through 2011, the subcategory Full-time instruction/research/public service
staff, by tenure status, academic rank, race/ethnicity, and gender (Degree-granting insti-
tutions with 15 or more full-time employees): Fall 1993 to 2011 was chosen in the section
Human Resources. The Tenured total (in the Total full-time instruction/research/public
service category) was used, limited on Professors (in the Select all academic ranks cate-
gory).
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B TABLE AND GRAPHICAL APPENDIX
Figure 14: Estimated coach gender effect on risk taking - intermediate standing
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Estimated effect of coach gender on risk-taking for different intermediate scores over game sub-quarters. Each data point corresponds to an
estimated coefficient for female coach by estimating model 1 for stratified sub-samples.
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Figure 15: Percentage of three-point attempts of all attempts from the field, by academic
year, team- and coach-gender
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Figure 16: Success and risk-taking: outcomes for fourth quarter only.
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Estimated coefficients for risk-taking quartile dummies dummies by team- and coach-gender. Reference group is the first quartile of three-point
share. All estimations include team-season dummies as well as opponent-season dummies. Only sub-quarter 4 is included.
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